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COLLABORATIVE LAWYERING: A PROCESS FOR
INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATION
Jim Hilbert*

I.

INTRODUCTION†

The emergence1 of collaborative law2 and the creation of the
Uniform Collaborative Law Act have raised a number of critical issues.
Most of the scholarship to date has focused appropriately on clarifying
just what collaborative law is and how it is practiced,3 and examining the
complex ethical issues that collaborative law raises.4 Many have
explored collaborative law’s place among other recent developments in
changing the structure of how lawyers work with clients to resolve their
problems.5
* Jim Hilbert is Executive Director of the Center for Negotiation and Justice at William
Mitchell College of Law, where he teaches Negotiation and Advanced Alternative Dispute
Resolution (“ADR”), and Vice President of Professional Services for Alignor, an international
negotiation firm (www.alignor.com). The author wishes to thank Julie Husmoe for her research
support.
† This Article is submitted as a follow-up to Mr. Hilbert’s co-facilitation of the session
“Collaborative Law in Non Family Law Disputes” at the November 20, 2009 conference on the
Uniform Collaborative Law Act at Hofstra University School of Law entitled, Collaborative Law:
Opportunities, Challenges and Questions for the Future.
1. Indeed, the growth of collaborative law has been characterized as “meteoric” and
“phenomenal.” See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, Growing Pains: Changes in Collaborative Law
and the Challenge of Legal Ethics, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 237, 239 (2008) (“Collaborative law’s
meteoric rise is well known.”); Gregory R. Solum, Collaborative Law: Not Just for Family
Lawyers, BENCH & B. MINN., Feb. 2010, http://www.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2010/feb10/
family.html (describing the “phenomenal growth” of collaborative law in the United States and
abroad).
2. Collaborative law is a fairly recent form of voluntary dispute resolution. In collaborative
law, the parties and their lawyers formally agree to use their best efforts to resolve the dispute
through negotiation, and that if for some reason they are unable to negotiate a settlement, the
lawyers cannot represent the parties in litigation of the dispute. See UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW
ACT, prefatory note (2009), in 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 421-66 (2009) [hereinafter UCLA] (discussing
the origins and purposes of collaborative law); see also Robert C. Bordone, Fitting the Ethics to the
Forum: A Proposal for Process-Enabling Ethical Codes, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 25
(2005) (“Collaborative lawyers and the parties who hire them agree that the collaborative attorneys
will serve their clients only during negotiation. Should the clients decide to change processes and
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In addition, collaborative law has re-energized the discussion on
how best to resolve legal disputes, particularly in family law,6 and the
working relationship between lawyers and their clients.7 Much of the
impetus for collaborative law comes from dissatisfaction with the
traditional approaches to legal disputes.8 As one commentator observed:
“Our current, traditional system of family law litigation is often
move toward litigation, the collaborative lawyers withdraw from representation and the clients agree
to hire other lawyers for the litigation stage.” (footnote omitted)).
3. See Sherrie R. Abney, The Evolution of Civil Collaborative Law, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 495, 497-98 (2009); Gay G. Cox & Robert J. Matlock, The Case for Collaborative Law, 11
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 45, 48-50 (2004); Susan Daicoff, Collaborative Law: A New Tool for the
Lawyer’s Toolkit, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 117-18 (2009) (detailing the history of
collaborative law); William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging
Practice, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 361-62 (2004); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family
Law, the New Lawyer, and Deep Resolution of Divorce-Related Conflicts, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 83,
88-92; Stu Webb, Collaborative Law: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Its History and Current
Practice, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 155, 155 (2008) (offering the founder’s “personal
recollection of the creation and development of collaborative law”).
4. See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Ethics and Collaborative Lawyering: Why Put Old
Hats on New Heads?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 505 (2003) (detailing the difficulty in
exacting precise ethical rules for collaborative law and other forms of ADR); Joshua Isaacs, A New
Way to Avoid the Courtroom: The Ethical Implications Surrounding Collaborative Law, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 833 (2005) (discussing the inapplicability of several of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to collaborative law); Scott R. Peppet, The (New) Ethics of Collaborative
Law, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2008, at 23 (discussing the differing opinions of scholars on what
the proper ethical rules should be as applied to collaborative law); Larry R. Spain, Collaborative
Law: A Critical Reflection on Whether a Collaborative Orientation Can Be Ethically Incorporated
into the Practice of Law, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 141 (2004) (discussing how the attorney-client
relationship in a collaborative law context is different from that of litigation).
5. See Julie Macfarlane, The Evolution of the New Lawyer: How Lawyers are Reshaping the
Practice of Law, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 61, 61 (“[E]ffective negotiation and settlement skills are
becoming increasingly central to the practice of law and occupy more of lawyers’ real time and
attention than adversarial trial lawyering.”). Collaborative law perhaps portends another seismic
shift in how legal disputes are resolved, following the path of mediation and unbundling. See Forrest
S. Mosten, Collaborative Law Practice: An Unbundled Approach to Informed Client Decision
Making, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 163, 163 (“Collaborative Law practice is an innovative clientcentered form of law that has evolved from the concepts of mediation and unbundling legal
services.”).
6. While family law is still its predominant focus, the collaborative law practice has
extended into many cases “involving contracts, partnership and corporate dissolutions, probate, and
sexual harassment/retaliation disputes.” Abney, supra note 4, at 514. But see Tesler, supra note 3, at
91 n.18 (“At the same time it is becoming clear that there is a unique affinity between the needs of
divorcing couples and the conflict resolution potentialities of Collaborative Law and
interdisciplinary Collaborative divorce team practice.”).
7. See Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 72 (“The changing conditions of legal practice and legal
disputing also require the development of a new model for a working partnership between lawyer
and client, one which is appropriate for the conditions of twenty-first century consumer needs and
demands.”).
8. “American civil family law litigation has been unsatisfactory for many years.” Daicoff,
supra note 3, at 114.
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disastrous emotionally and financially for families and divorcing
couples.”9
The rise of settlements generally as the dominant form of conflict
resolution for all legal disputes serves as testimony to the changing
dynamics in the litigation process.10 Parties have been relying on
negotiation and settlement for years because of the obvious benefits of
minimizing costs, saving time, avoiding the risks of uncertainty of trial,
controlling the outcome of litigation, and perhaps even improving the
relationship between the parties.11
Collaborative law takes these developments to the next level,
prescribing negotiation as the exclusive means for dispute resolution.12
Importantly, collaborative law promotes a certain type of negotiation,
namely “interest-based” negotiation.13 This is a process-driven approach
9. Id. at 145. The traditional litigation model is not the only challenge in family law these
days. More than half of all family law parties now confront the daunting task of navigating the
complexities of the family law courthouse without an attorney. See Jim Hilbert, Educational
Workshops on Settlement and Dispute Resolution: Another Tool for Self-Represented Litigants in
Family Court, 43 FAM. L.Q. 545, 547-51 (2009) (documenting the numbers of pro se parties in
family court and the signficant challenges they face).
10. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 466 (2004); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 485, 488 n.19 (1985) (“Settlement rates of about 90% are remarkably constant in civil
litigation, criminal cases, and family cases.”).
11. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 956-57 (1979).
There are obvious and substantial savings when a couple can resolve distributional
consequences of divorce without resort to courtroom adjudication. The financial cost of
litigation, both private and public, is minimized. The pain of a formal adversary
proceeding is avoided. Recent psychological studies indicate that children benefit when
parents agree on custodial arrangements. Moreover, a negotiated agreement allows the
parties to avoid the risks and uncertainties of litigation, which may involve all-or-nothing
consequences. Given the substantial delays that often characterize contested judicial
proceedings, agreement can often save time and allow each spouse to proceed with his or
her life. Finally, a consensual solution is by definition more likely to be consistent with
the preferences of each spouse, and acceptable over time, than would a result imposed by
a court.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
12. Failure to resolve the matter through negotiation results in the disqualification of the
clients’ attorneys from representing them in any litigation on the matter. See UCLA, supra note 2,
§ 9, at 481-82. (outlining the “disqualification requirement”). “The disqualification requirement for
collaborative lawyers after collaborative law concludes is a fundamental defining characteristic of
collaborative law.” Id. § 9 cmt., at 482; see also Tesler, supra note 3, at 91 (“[T]he lawyers are hired
solely to help the parties reach resolution of their differences, and . . . the lawyers may never
participate in any adversarial proceedings between the parties.”).
13. John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1380
(2003) (“[Collaborative law] provides an important structure, set of incentives, and norms favoring
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that focuses on the underlying needs of all parties involved.14 Perhaps
because it may merely extend the trends already embedded in the legal
system toward more settlements and a more collaborative, problemsolving approach to negotiations,15 the push by collaborative law for
lawyers (and their clients) to use exclusively interest-based negotiation
as the only means to handle legal claims is often nothing more than an
afterthought in the face of larger concerns.16 The perhaps overlooked
presumption of collaborative law is that the lawyers can effectively use
interest-based negotiation.17 Interest-based negotiation does not just
spontaneously occur, particularly between lawyers.18 Indeed, there are

interest-based negotiation. This is an important contribution.”). While it does not explicitly require
“interest-based negotiating,” it is clear the UCLA means to encourage that approach as the exclusive
negotiation strategy. UCLA, supra note 2, prefatory note, at 426 (“The goal of collaborative law is
to encourage parties to engage in ‘problem-solving’ rather than ‘positional’ negotiations.”). The
term “interest-based negotiation” is used as an umbrella description for the problem solving and
collaborative approaches to negotiation. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 51-52 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981); ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES
32-33 (2000) (discussing various ways to approach problem solving and negotiations); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving,
31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 795 (1984) (discussing the objectives of problem solving).
14. See Alex J. Hurder, The Lawyer’s Dilemma: To Be or Not to Be a Problem-Solving
Negotiator, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 253, 283 (2007) (defining interest-based negotiation as requiring a
“focus not only on the needs and values of their clients, but also on the needs and values of their
clients’ counterparts in order to serve their clients well.”).
15. See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text (describing the growing trend by lawyers to
adopt interest-based approaches to negotiating the resolution of legal disputes). But see infra Part
II.A (chronicling the many challenges lawyers have in implementing interest-based negotiating).
16. Criticisms of collaborative law usually center on the ethical concerns, client informed
consent, and the disqualification requirement mandating that clients find new lawyers if they choose
or are forced to litigate the matter. See Memorandum from the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution
to the ABA Sections, Divs. & Members of the ABA House of Delegates 4-7 (Sept. 27, 2009),
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/DR035000/sitesofinterest_files/DRSectionMem
oreUCLAtoSectionsandDe_.pdf (detailing and addressing the specific concerns expressed by the
ABA Litigation Section); see also John Lande, Learning from “Cooperative” Negotiators in
Wisconsin, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2009, at 20, 21-22 (cataloging the concerns by cooperative
law practitioners about the disqualification requirement in collaborative law).
17. Importantly, the UCLA does address the problem of ensuring that the attorneys at least
attempt to practice interest-based negotiating. By requiring that attorneys withdraw if the
negotiation is not successful, the UCLA is at the very least encouraging the attorneys to conduct the
negotiation seriously with an eye toward actual resolution. See UCLA, supra note 2, prefatory note,
at 426-27 (“Because of these mutually agreed upon costs of failure to agree, collaborative law is a
modern method of addressing the age old dilemma for parties to a negotiation of assuring that one’s
negotiating counterpart is and will continue to be a true collaborator rather than a sharpie.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
18. See infra Part II.A (highlighting some of the reasons why lawyers are not necessarily
predisposed to use interest-based negotiating techniques).
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often significant barriers that limit its effective use by practitioners and
its acceptance by clients.19
This Article addresses the process for interest-based negotiation and
how lawyers can address these specific challenges. The Article begins
with an overview of interest-based negotiation and its evolution in the
legal practice.20 The Article addresses the barriers that often stand
between lawyers and the practice of interest-based negotiation and how
clients, too, may contribute their own limitations to the mix.21 The
Article then discusses particular aspects of interest-based approaches and
outlines a step-by-step process for implementing interest-based
negotiating.22
II.

THE RISE OF INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATION

Just as collaborative law grew out of a dissatisfaction with the
traditional approaches it sought to replace, so too has interest-based
negotiation grown as an alternative to an unappealing but conventional
form of competitive legal negotiation. Over the past few decades, a mind
shift has revolutionized the way lawyers and others think about
negotiation.23 While alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) and other
new approaches blossomed to try to find new and improved ways to
resolve legal disputes,24 scholars and practitioners gravitated to a more
principled form of negotiating and resolving disputes: interest-based
negotiation.25
Substantial momentum for interest-based negotiation comes from
legal educators. Today the vast majority of negotiation and dispute
resolution law school courses advocate for the use of interest-based
negotiation for doing deals and resolving conflict.26 Interest-based
negotiation has become well-recognized as the “best practices” approach
among academics.27 The overwhelming majority of negotiation scholars
19. Clients in collaborative law have an influential role in all decision making. See Abney,
supra note 3, at 495 (“The public has begun looking for alternative ways to achieve the resolution of
disputes in order to give individuals and companies more control over the dispute resolution process
as well as a greater voice in the final outcome of their disputes.”).
20. See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part II.A–B.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See Bordone, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing the origins of the modern ADR movement).
24. See id. at 6 (discussing the expansion of dispute resolution processes).
25. See Hurder, supra note 14, at 278-82 (detailing the history and development of interestbased negotiation by lawyers).
26. See Bordone, supra note 2, at 16-17.
27.
While most negotiation instructors continue to expose their students to various
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recommend that lawyers adopt an interest-based approach to
negotiation.28
Practitioners are beginning to have the same view. More and more,
practitioners and lawyers recognize the value of interest-based
negotiation as well, and with good reason.29 Research shows that
“increasingly adversarial behavior was perceived [by other lawyers] as
increasingly ineffective.”30 Training can play an important role.
Practitioners who have been effectively trained in the interest-based
approach are more likely to find better solutions to deals than those
without such training.31
A. The Challenges for Lawyers
Despite the wide recognition that interest-based negotiation is the
preferred and more effective approach,32 lawyers have had a harder time
embracing it and effectively implementing the strategy.33 Some have
competing models of negotiation, including competitive, adversarial, and zero-sum
approaches, the vast majority of negotiation teaching and pedagogy identifies interestbased negotiation, the goal of which is to expand the size of the overall pie before
dividing it, as a “best practice” in negotiation.
Id. at 16.
28. See, e.g., Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J. 369,
370-71 nn.3-4 (1996) (citing a lengthy list of negotiation scholars who recommend an integrative or
problem-solving approach to bargaining); see also Bordone, supra note 2, at 18 (describing an
“ever-shrinking minority of those who continue to teach ‘tricks and tips’ as the preferred approach
to legal negotiations.”).
29. This is particularly true in family law. See, e.g., Gary Voegele et al., Collaborative Law:
A Useful Tool for the Family Law Practitioner to Promote Better Outcomes, 33 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 971, 985 (2006) (“The principle of interest-based bargaining is widely accepted as having
particular value in family law matters involving children, since many parents recognize that the
importance of their common interests outweigh their differences.”). Interest-based negotiation,
however, has not yet been adopted throughout the legal practice. See infra Part II.A.
30. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the
Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 196 (2002). Conversely, “[w]hen
lawyers are able to maximize their problem-solving skills balancing assertiveness and empathy, they
are more effective on behalf of their clients.” Id. at 197.
31. See Bordone, supra note 2, at 19 (“We also know that parties who have been trained in
interest-based bargaining are more likely to find value-creating trades than those who have
not . . . .”). In fact, training in interest-based negotiation is a core prerequisite to practicing
collaborative law. See Barbara Glesner Fines, Ethical Issues in Collaborative Lawyering, 21 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 141, 144 (2008) (“Attorneys should not undertake collaborative law
practice without sufficient training in interest-based negotiation and other skills necessary to
effectively assist their clients in collaboration.”).
32. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
33. Indeed, for some lawyers, it is a larger problem than just embracing an interest-based
approach. Some lawyers are just bad negotiators. See Hurder, supra note 14, at 254 (“The fact that
lawyers are not optimally prepared to negotiate is undoubtedly one force behind the increase in
multi-disciplinary practice. Litigants and entrepreneurs are turning to other professionals who are
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observed that while many lawyers may understand the basic components
of interest-based negotiating, they struggle with its execution.34 Lawyers
(and their clients) seem either to one, go back to old habits and fall into
adversarial modes (often in response to other lawyers employing
competitive strategies)35 or two, employ only a partial or half-hearted
interest-based strategy to their detriment (for example, overemphasizing
empathy to the exclusion of asserting their own needs).36
Part of the challenge for lawyers comes from the culture and
structure of the legal practice. For example, the ethical rules themselves
may create pressure to utilize less interest-based approaches.37 As one
scholar notes, “under the [Model Rules of Professional Responsibility]
the ABA has unambiguously embraced New York hardball as the
official standard of practice.”38 Lawyers must wonder how to engage in
joint problem-solving approaches while zealously representing their
clients through puffery and other permitted tactics.39
In addition, the legal culture still holds on to the “give-and-take”
and more competitive forms of bargaining for doing deals and settling
lawsuits.40 Interest-based negotiating remains “counterculture” to many
practicing lawyers and their clients.41 Some collaborative law advocates
even worry that “the ‘attorney personality’ itself may be an obstacle to
better negotiators.”).
34. See Lande, supra note 13, at 1363-64 & n.182.
35. See id. at 1380 (“Although many traditional divorce lawyers intend to act cooperatively
and often do so, they can get easily diverted. When lawyers perceive that the opposing side is acting
unreasonably, they often reciprocate to protect their clients and demonstrate that they will not be
bullied.”).
36. Based on personal observations of the author and corroborated through discussions with
other negotiation and ADR practitioners and scholars.
37. See Schneider, supra note 30, at 147 (“The duty to zealously represent is often interpreted
to mean that lawyers should negotiate by any means possible.”).
38. Bordone, supra note 2, at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Indeed, the ethical rules “explicitly permit exaggeration and puffed up claims.” Schneider,
supra note 30, at 147. The UCLA hopes to overcome such behaviors through the disqualification
requirement. See UCLA, supra note 2, prefatory note, at 427 (“[The disqualification requirement]
solves the age old problem for negotiators of deciding whether to cooperate or compete in a
situation where each side does not know the other’s intentions and ‘when the pursuit of self-interest
by each leads to a poor outcome for all’—the famous ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ of game theory.”
(quoting ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7 (1984))).
40. See Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 32
(“[A]s a matter of practice, the give-and-take of negotiation has always been a characteristic of the
negotiating process among lawyers.”).
41. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why Hasn’t the World Gotten to Yes? An Appreciation and
Some Reflections, 22 NEGOT. J. 485, 497 (2006) (“To focus on underlying interests and to approach
another party in a negotiation with the idea of forging a joint agreement that would meet the needs
of both parties was—and I am afraid, still is—countercultural to the way in which most parties
approach negotiations.”).
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effective collaborative practice.”42
B. The Challenges for Clients
In contrast to the traditional litigation model where clients play a
subordinate role to attorneys in the development and implementation of
strategy, clients in collaborative law are essential players in the
negotiations.43 Clients are generally present during negotiations and are
“actively participating” in the process.44 Their role is at least as co-equal
contributors, and in many respects, they are calling the shots.45
Clients, however, often do not necessarily have the right training or
mindset to support interest-based negotiation. Their understanding of the
legal system generally and how disputes are meant to be resolved are
often poisoned by limited information from sources other than their
attorneys.46 Unrealistic television dramas may be the real culprit
misinforming clients about lawyers and negotiation.47 Setting aside the
depictions of the legal system, television and other media present very
distorted views of how to negotiate. Resolving legal disputes or other
deal-making scenarios are often portrayed in over-the-top negotiation
wrestling matches.48

42. Daicoff, supra note 3, at 138.
43. “Rather than delegating decision-making responsibility to attorneys, parties are in charge
of determining both the process and ultimate terms of the resolution.” Mosten, supra note 5, at 164.
44. See Lande, supra note 16, at 22 (“[T]he Collaborative-process [in Wisconsin] is done
almost exclusively in four-way meetings.”); Tesler, supra note 3, at 91 (“All negotiations take place
face to face, with the parties present and actively participating according to a structured sequence of
tasks and agendas.”).
45. For collaborative law clients, they get to run the operation. See Abney, supra note 3, at
498 (“The clients’ role in the collaborative process is almost the exact opposite of the role they play
in litigation. Collaborative clients must be able to participate in every stage of the collaborative
process. While litigation is lawyer driven, the collaborative process is client driven.”).
46. Lawrence P. McLellan, Expanding the Use of Collaborative Law: Consideration of Its
Use in a Legal Aid Program for Resolving Family Law Disputes, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 465, 465.
47. Id. (“From Perry Mason and Law & Order to Judge Judy, many American consumers
believe that legal conflict is resolved by trial—exciting, antagonistic, adversarial fights between
lawyers. Yet common experience and research demonstrate that most legal conflict is not resolved
between gladiators in the courtroom. Many consumers come to the legal process with this
Hollywood portrayal as their only knowledge of the process.”).
48. See, e.g., Entourage: Strange Days (HBO television broadcast July 23, 2006), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MTf3YDNAT70 (depicting a classic, overblown example of
antagonistic haggling loaded with personal insults and expletives). Television can have a most
powerful effect on our perceptions. See Kimberlianne Podlas, As Seen on TV: The Normative
Influence of Syndi-Court on Contemporary Litigiousness, 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 21-22
(2004) (“Individuals learn from what they see on television, and, even if they forget the specific
elements, retain general impressions that can influence their perceptions of the world.” (footnote
omitted)).
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In addition, the emotional content of their legal dispute itself may
contribute to their inability to embrace an interest-based approach. While
clients may have some experience in negotiating, most of those lessons
are probably ill-suited to help them resolve their disputes.49 “Most
people have very limited views of how to resolve conflict, particularly
when they are one of the parties to the dispute.”50 Moreover, legal
disputes (and family law issues, in particular) bring additional stress that
may make negotiating quite difficult.51 Patterns of animosity and
dysfunctional communication are unlikely to improve during a legal
dispute over marital property, custody of children, or other family issues,
for example.52 These emotions combined with their own limited
experience create significant barriers for clients in practicing an interestbased approach.53
Implementing interest-based negotiation is challenging even
without the external pressures of the legal culture and media depictions.
The challenges to understanding and conducting effective negotiations
can be overwhelming and intimidating to anyone. In his comments about
the 1932 Disarmament Conference in Geneva, Albert Einstein remarked,
“What the inventive genius of mankind has bestowed upon us in the last
hundred years could have made human life care free and happy if the
development of the organizing power of man had been able to keep step
with his technical advances.”54

49.
50.
51.
52.

Hilbert, supra note 9, at 560.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 54-55 (1992) (“The strong emotions attending the
spousal divorce may pose a formidable barrier to collaborative, cool, and rational problem-solving.
Joint problem-solving and negotiation work best with clear communication and good listening
skills. Many couples lacked these skills during the marriage itself, and divorce is obviously an
extremely difficult time to develop them.”).
53. See McLellan, supra note 46, at 479-80 (“Likewise, their negotiating experiences may
have left them suspicious, skeptical, and overly cautious. Combine these life experiences with the
emotionally charged atmosphere of a family law dispute, and a participant may be highly agitated
and unwilling to trust his or her spouse, let alone the process.”).
54. Albert Einstein, The 1932 Disarmament Conference, THE NATION, Sept. 23, 1931, at 300.
See also Bruce M. Patton, Can Negotiation Be Taught: On Teaching Negotiation, in TEACHING
NEGOTIATION: IDEAS AND INNOVATIONS 7, 54 n.14 (Michael Wheeler ed., 2000) (“There is a story,
possibly apocryphal but in character, that Einstein was asked, shortly after the Second World War,
why, when the nearly incomprehensible secrets of the invisible atom had been unlocked, we had
still not solved the familiar problem of war. His alleged reply: ‘Politics is more complicated than
physics.’”).
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A PROCESS FOR INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATIONS FOR LAWYERS
AND THEIR CLIENTS

To overcome the barriers faced by both the lawyers and the clients
in implementing an interest-based approach, a process55 is necessary to
guide both players through the right method and focus.56 Importantly,
the process discussed below was first used to settle major litigation.57 It
was designed originally by plaintiffs’ civil rights and antitrust lawyers to
support negotiation strategies that they had been using with clients for
years.58 Use of the process on its own had already resulted in settlements
of a wide range of lawsuits from desegregation and class action
discrimination cases to international business disputes with antitrust
claims.59 Over time, clients began to use the process on a wider range of
negotiation challenges, including merger-acquisitions, resolving internal
conflict, and building stronger relationships with business partners.60
As explained more fully below, the process applies an interestbased approach that focuses on the key information necessary for
negotiation planning and implementation. The process walks lawyers
and their clients61 through an interest-based approach and helps them
capture and understand the key information.62
55. The term “process” is used here to define a systematic, disciplined approach that can be
explained to and repeated by those who use it.
56. See JOHN G. SHULMAN, LEVERAGING RELATIONSHIPS FOR SUSTAINABLE VALUE 39
(2007).
57. See id. at 1.
58. The negotiation process has been formalized through software tools, paper forms, and
other templates to capture the key information, as explained more fully below. See id. at 42
(displaying a recent form of the paper worksheet Alignor has used with clients to support the
negotiation process).
59. See id. at 1.
60. The international negotiation firm Alignor was formed to handle these negotiations. See
Alignor About Us, http://www.alignor.com/aboutus.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2010). Alignor would
later brand the negotiation process “The Alignor [P]rocess.” See Alignor, http://www.alignor.com/
(last visited Sept. 28, 2010). For a perspective from an Alignor client on the use of the process for
resolving litigation as well as putting together complex business deals, see WILLIAM T. MONAHAN,
BILLION DOLLAR TURNAROUND: THE 3M SPINOFF THAT BECAME IMATION 166-81 (2005) (sharing
examples and commentary on use of the “Alignor Process” at Imation Corp. as told by the former
CEO and Chair of the Board).
61. One key feature of the interest-based process described is its capacity to promote
transparent and effective attorney-client communications. Donald G. Gifford, The Synthesis of
Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the
Negotiation Context, 34 UCLA L. REV. 811, 853-54 (1987) (“[T]he problem-solving approach is
premised on the assumption that negotiators consult regularly with their clients.”).
62. MONAHAN, supra note 60, at 175.
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The process unpacks interest-based negotiation into its simplest,
elemental forms.63 As noted above, the challenges to implementing
interest-based negotiation are significant.64 Yet effective negotiation can
be done, even by clients without training and with emotional and
experiential constraints if the necessary steps are understood and
simplified.65 By isolating the necessary steps, the process makes simple
what is required for both preparation and implementation of an interestbased approach.66 As a result, the process (known commercially as “The
Alignor Process”) has been taught to and used by business executives,
judges, lawyers, students, and Head Start parents, among many others.67
The process uses three simple steps: (1) who is involved and what
do they need?; (2) what can be done to satisfy those needs?; (3) what
happens if there is no agreement?68 While straightforward and easy to
understand, each step enforces hard thinking and requires detailed and
complete pieces of data, as outlined below.
A. Step One: Who Is Involved and What Do They Need?
The first step in the negotiation process uses three concepts:
stakeholders, issues, and interests.69 Stakeholders are the people or
organizations involved in, or affected by, the negotiation.70 Issues are
matters or things of concern to any stakeholder, and they could matter to
more than one stakeholder.71 Interests are the needs of the stakeholders
on any particular issue.72 Step one is the identification (or
modification)73 of this key information: stakeholders, issues, and
interests.74 As an example, consider the typical, relatively oversimplified
divorce with a custody dispute between the wife and husband.
63. Id. at 168 (noting the Alignor process is broken down into three easy steps).
64. See supra Part II.A–B (detailing the many barriers lawyers and clients face in effectively
using interest-based negotiation).
65. Clients (and lawyers presumably) need to understand the “how to” in simple, bite-sized
chunks—in terms of things they can do and understand. See Roy J. Lewicki, Seven Teaching
Challenges for Business School ADR, 16 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 113, 128 (1998)
(“We need to break down ‘negotiating skill’ into specific component skill sets which we can teach,
drill and measure.”).
66. See MONAHAN, supra note 60, at 168.
67. Alignor pioneered this three step process as a system for negotiating in any context. See,
e.g., SHULMAN, supra note 56, at 38-44 (applying the three step process for handling particularly
difficult negotiators).
68. The three steps appear in many different forms, but the underlying methodology is always
the same. See id.
69. Id. at 42.
70. Stakeholders, of course, can include non-parties and even people not “at the table” during
the negotiation, including business partners, spouses, potential customers, or anyone else who is
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The first step is to identify the stakeholders to the negotiation,
which would include the wife and the husband (and could also include
others, such as any children, the wife’s parents or husband’s parents, or
even the parties’ lawyers, for example).75 This is followed by the issues,
going stakeholder by stakeholder, and identifying what each stakeholder
may care about concerning the negotiation.76 Here the issues might
include the timing of the resolution of this matter, which parent will
have custody (or joint custody), and the splitting of the assets.77

affected by the outcome of the negotiation. See, e.g., Gregory S. Weber, Initial Steps Towards an
Assessment of the Potential for a Collaborative Approach to Colorado Delta Ecosystem
Restoration, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 79, 86 (2006) (describing the many
stakeholders involved in resolving a major environmental matter through an interest-based
approach).
71. Issues are not necessarily problems, but are those matters at stake in the negotiation, such
as challenges, concerns or obligations of the stakeholders. See, e.g., MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note
13, at 11-13 (describing issues involved in a hypothetical negotiation between a landlord and
prospective tenant). Of course, one negotiation challenge that often arises is an overemphasis on one
particular issue (typically money), sometimes to the exclusion of all others. See id. at 28
(demonstrating how parties can resolve conflict by identifying important non-monetary issues);
Harold I. Abramson, Problem-Solving Advocacy in Mediations, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.-Oct. 2004, at
56, 58 (“When both sides thinks [sic] the dispute is about money and who is right and who is wrong,
they are framing the dispute in a very narrow way. This prevents them from seeing other issues and
opportunities for mutually beneficial trades.”).
72. In any decision or negotiation, people evaluate how well any set of options will satisfy
their interests. Interests are therefore the engine driving all decisions and negotiations. Importantly,
the analysis must focus on the stakeholder’s actual needs from the stakeholder’s perspective, not
what might be “typical” for that type of person or client. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13, at
804.
73. Because it is process based, lawyers and their clients can revisit and update the analysis
throughout the negotiation as new information is obtained or circumstances changed. Accordingly,
the discussion of interests is not meant only as a one-time event. Lawyers and clients return to their
(shared) analysis over and over again as they advance their understanding and prepare to implement
strategies. It encourages lawyers to listen carefully to and confirm the interests of their clients (in
addition to the other stakeholders). See, e.g., Tesler, supra note 3, at 111 (“The protocol in a typical
Collaborative divorce team collaboration is that before negotiations take place, there will be honest
exploration of the clients’ values, interests, goals, and concerns.”).
74. See MONAHAN, supra note 60, at 168.
75. See supra note 70.
76. See MONAHAN, supra note 60, at 168.
77. For purposes of being as precise as possible in the analysis, there is a distinction between
issues and interests. Issues are the topics or matters of concern, rather than the actual description of
the underlying needs. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 28 (describing the difference between
the identification of issues and interests). It is important to describe issues as objectively as possible
so that the underlying interests of the stakeholders can be identified without distorting the analysis.
In the example, the issue concerning the custody of the children is properly defined as “parenting
plan” or “custody” rather than “keeping my kids,” which would be an interest. By describing the
issue objectively, underlying interests can be identified clearly and their relationship can be
explored with limited bias.
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After the stakeholders and issues, the last part of step one is the
identification of the specific interests of each stakeholder on each
issue.78 Using the example on the issue of custody, there is the
consideration of the wife’s possible interest (as the first stakeholder),
which could be to make sure that the wife controls the custody or gets
full custody; while the husband’s interest might be to have sufficient
contact or access to his children. A similar process for each issue
continues until all of the stakeholders’ interests have been identified.
As detailed more fully below, the information is compiled in an
interest chart,79 which might look something like this:
STAKEHOLDERS:
ISSUES:

Wife

Husband

Well-being of the Children

PRESERVE

PRESERVE

Conflict / Emotional Pain

MINIMIZE

MINIMIZE

Timing of Resolution

ASAP

ASAP

Legal Fees and Costs

LIMIT

LIMIT

Child Support

AMPLE

SUFFICIENT

Parenting Plan / Custody

WIFE CONTROL

ACCESS

House / Property

KEEP

LIQUIDATE

© Alignor 1999–2010.

78. Naturally more than one stakeholder may have an interest on a particular issue, and the
relationship between those stakeholders’ interest can be quite useful to understand. See infra note 82
and accompanying text.
79. See SHULMAN, supra note 56, at 42 (displaying an Alignor Process Worksheet graphic).
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As shown above, in addition to identifying the substantive interest
(e.g., ample or sufficient), there is also the relationship between
stakeholder interests and the importance of each interest to the particular
stakeholder. For example, on the issue of the house and property, both
the wife and husband have their own actual interests on that issue. In this
example, the wife wants to keep the property while the husband wants to
liquidate (perhaps to pay off some debt or cover future child support).
These interests are opposite, while stakeholder interests on other issues
could be the same or different, as shown above, but not opposite.
In each case, it is worth noting the relationship between stakeholder
interests for each issue.80 Similarly, the importance of the interest to each
stakeholder (critical, important, or not important) is added to the
analysis.81 For example, the wife’s interest in minimizing the conflict and
emotional pain (where her interest in preserving the well-being of the
children might be critical), and the husband’s interest in minimizing the
conflict and emotional pain might be critical. By thinking through both
the relationship between interests and the particular weight parties give
to the individual interests, the true insights emerge. It is in the
identification of possible trade-offs in the future, based on differences in
the value of interests between the parties, where creative solutions will
lie.82

80. While it may be quite obvious what the relationship between interests might be when
thinking about only one issue, such as well-being of the children, it is entirely a different matter to
try to keep all of the stakeholder interest relationships in mind in a negotiation with ten or more
different issues. Displaying where the interests are in common or merely different, but not opposite,
can help negotiators order their talking points and keep their clients informed and on the same page.
81. Critical interests are near deal-breakers, important issues matter but can be more easily
exchanged as necessary to satisfy critical interests, and unimportant interests do not really matter to
stakeholders. Importantly, it may not be necessary to satisfy every critical interest for a particular
stakeholder, so long as a sufficient number of their critical interests are satisfied and the overall
package is better for them than the alternatives. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
82. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value
Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995).
The first, and perhaps most general, source of value creation relates to differences
between the parties. Students in negotiation courses often erroneously believe that winwin negotiations somehow depend on finding similarities—common interests shared by
both sides. In fact, it is characteristically differences in preferences, relative valuations,
predictions about the future, and risk preferences that fuel value-creating opportunities.
The basic principle is fundamental to economics: Trade should occur—and surplus can
be created—when one party places a high relative value on a good or service that the
other party values less highly.
Id.; see also Hurder, supra note 14, at 267 (“Finding something that has less value to the person
who has it than it does to the person who needs it can create value. This is possible because people
can have complementary interests, i.e., interests that are not mutually exclusive, interests that can be
met without harming the other.” (footnote omitted)).
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From a best practices standpoint, the process enforces an interestbased approach by both lawyers and their clients because each must
adopt the perspective of every stakeholder and presume what each
stakeholder wants on the individual issues.83 After initial identification
of the step one information, lawyers and clients then have the
opportunity to test and reevaluate interests (or discover new interests) of
the parties during the negotiation or preliminary discussions. As a result,
they are thinking and listening in terms of parties’ interests as well as
considering how the relationship between interests and the importance of
interests play into the decision making of the various parties.84
B.

Step Two: What Can Be Done to Satisfy Those Needs?

Step two uses three separate activities: brainstorming possible
actions,85 evaluating those actions, and putting together packages of
actions that could form a proposal or agreement. First, there is
brainstorming as many actions as conceivable, using the interest chart as
a guide, going issue-by-issue.86 The process of brainstorming can be
structured so that actions are identified not just to satisfy the client’s
interests, but to address all of the stakeholders’ interests. Because the
focus is on all of the stakeholders’ interests (through use of the interest
chart), the brainstormed list is much more comprehensive than what
might otherwise be generated.87 Also, by being systematic,88 it
“counteracts the tendency of many lawyers to be overly critical and to
seek only the ‘best answer’ to a problem as a result of their personalities
or their legal training.”89
83. See id. at 267-68.
84. The creation of the interest chart enforces empathy and requires lawyers and clients to
map out the interests of each party, something that is easier to discuss than to actually do. See
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13, at 795 (“The principle underlying such an approach is that
unearthing a greater number of the actual needs of the parties will create more possible
solutions . . . .”).
85. Actions are possible options for satisfying the interests of stakeholders through a
negotiated agreement. They are specific components that could be part of a possible proposal or
eventual deal, such as (1) allowing the husband to have the kids on every other Thanksgiving, (2)
agreeing to split all legal fees, (3) a mutual non-disparagement clause, and (4) establish ground rules
for parenting.
86. The process for brainstorming is relatively straightforward. It is most helpful to start with
the first issue and go issue-by-issue down the interest chart creating possible actions to satisfy all of
the interests for that issue, including interests of all of the parties. By going issue-by-issue and
looking at the interests of all of the stakeholders, the number of possible actions can be quite robust,
and it is also a comprehensive list of what could be done to satisfy any interest of any particular
stakeholder. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13, at 809 (“The needs of the parties, therefore,
may serve as a springboard for potential solutions to the problem.”). There is also a significant
relationship-building aspect for lawyer and client:
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Once brainstorming is finished, the possible actions are then
evaluated.90 The lawyer and client can carefully consider together the
impact of each action on all stakeholder interests.91 The process for
evaluation maintains an objective approach to consideration of each
possible action by enforcing a systematic review of each action against
each interest.92
After evaluating the actions, the lawyer and client can see how
various combinations of actions (action plans) would impact the interests
of the stakeholders. They can evaluate various combinations against the
interests and look at which combinations make the most sense. They can
Brainstorming actively involves the client in the negotiation process, builds rapport, and
often provides the client with a more realistic picture of the difficulties to be faced
during the negotiation. Brainstorming with the client also increases the likelihood that
negotiations will yield desirable results. Clients, particularly those engaged in businesses
or other specialized activities, frequently know more about their problems and possible
solutions than do the lawyers. In addition, several individuals brainstorming about a
problem tend to generate more potential solutions than only two negotiators, and thus
they increase the likelihood of finding a solution that satisfies the underlying needs of
both parties.
Gifford, supra note 61, at 850.
87. Fostering the process of creative thinking and generating innovative options is difficult.
See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Creativity and Problem-Solving, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 697, 707-08
(2004) (discussing the limitations to what is known about enhancing creativity). As a process point,
when clients brainstorm possible actions, it is important to clarify that they are not taking a position
or committing to a given course of action, particularly if they are enlisting the help of others or even
other stakeholders. Brainstorming is merely imagining all of the possibilities for satisfying
stakeholder interests through a joint decision or negotiated agreement. That way, every idea, even
actions that on their own might be quite unappealing, are unearthed in the search for the ideal
package of possible actions. See Gifford, supra note 61, at 849 (“The participants in a brainstorming
session are encouraged to articulate whatever possible solutions come to mind, regardless of how
ridiculous or nonviable they initially appear. The lawyer and client suspend critical evaluation and
judgment until all possible proposals have been listed, and only then do they consciously and
systematically consider the viability of each option and its advantages and disadvantages.”); see
also MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 38 (“When brainstorming, avoid the temptation to critique
ideas as they are being generated.”).
88. Without some sort of structure, it is very challenging to truly brainstorm creative ideas.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in
Legal Education? 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 97-98 (2001) (discussing the challenges to “the
‘creation’ of solutions to legal problems” in the legal education context).
89. Gifford, supra note 61, at 850.
90. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 38 (“[E]valuation should be a separate activity,
not mixed with the process of generating ideas.”).
91. See Gifford, supra note 61, at 849 (describing how the lawyer and client together
“consciously and systematically consider the viability of each option and its advantages and
disadvantages”). As an aside, the lawyer or client can limit the evaluation to only those actions that
might realistically be included in a possible proposal or eventual deal (and dispose of any actions
that have no chance of being in the mix) to speed up the process.
92. Even though each action was generated from a focus on a particular issue in the
brainstorming, actions may impact interests on multiple issues.
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also see whether various combinations might fail to satisfy (or even
harm) critical interests of certain stakeholders, and modify the action
plan accordingly.93 They can brainstorm additional actions to include in
the action plan, if needed, particularly for their own interests.94 The
analysis can then help the lawyer when communicating a proposal to the
other party by helping organize how to be explicit about how each
proposal component impacts the actual interests of that party.
C. Step Three: What Happens if There Is No Agreement?
Step three includes the same activities as step two, brainstorming,
evaluating, and considering various packages or plans. The focus of step
three, however, is not on agreement, but rather on what might happen if
there is no agreement. Instead of actions designed to satisfy interests,
step three concerns stakeholders’ “fighting alternatives.” Unlike the
concept of best alternative to negotiated agreement (“BATNA”),95
fighting alternatives are the things stakeholders might do not only to
satisfy their own interests unilaterally,96 but also things they could do
that might harm the interests of others.97

93. Of course, it is not necessary for a proposal to satisfy every interest of every stakeholder.
In fact that would be impossible. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 263.
94. One should try to find sufficient value for the other side, and certainly avoid derailing the
negotiation by being too one-sided. See id. at 263 (advising against “asking for too much”).
95. See FISHER & URY, supra note 13, at 101; see also Renee A. Pistone, Case Studies: The
Ways to Achieve More Effective Negotiations, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 425, 437 (2007) (“The
client’s BATNA is defined as what will happen (or what is the best that I can do) if the negotiation
does not work and/or we do not settle.”). The term BATNA is firmly entrenched in the negotiation
and dispute resolution lexicon. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 326 n.5 (“The term has
gained wide acceptance in the negotiation literature.”).
96. SHULMAN, supra note 56, at 44.
97. While certainly parties must understand their “Plan B” in case there is no agreement, the
concept of fighting alternatives goes beyond just what a party might do in the alternative to an
agreement. Parties will not only pursue their respective BATNAs, but they will also likely pursue
courses of action that could harm the interests of the other parties, whether intentional or not.
Negotiators must also understand the impact of what other parties might do if there is no agreement.
See David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to Negotiation, in
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 97, 98-100 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds.,
1999) (discussing the necessity for close examination of the alternatives to a negotiated agreement
that are available to all parties); see also SHULMAN, supra note 56, at 44 n.1 (“While ‘fighting
alternatives’ is similar to ‘BATNA,’ I have found that in the real world the absence of a negotiated
agreement means more than just people trying to satisfy their own interests unilaterally. The
absence of a negotiated agreement—particularly when you are dealing with difficult people—often
means conflict! And conflict means people impose consequences against their perceived adversaries
even when those imposing the consequences do not themselves benefit from the consequences.”).
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The brainstorming in step three is similar to step two, as the lawyer
and client together identify all of the possible fighting alternatives in a
systematic manner.98 There are, however, two important distinctions.
First, unlike possible actions for a negotiated agreement, fighting
alternatives are unilateral things that a stakeholder can do regardless of
whether other stakeholders agree to that alternative.99 Therefore, each
stakeholder has its own set of fighting alternatives.100 Second, since
fighting alternatives (unlike negotiated actions) are pursued unilaterally
and are not part of an agreement with other stakeholders, they may or
may not actually happen.101 Accordingly, it is necessary then to predict
the likelihood that a given fighting alternative, if attempted, will actually
occur.102
The methods for evaluating fighting alternatives and examining
packages of fighting alternatives are identical to the processes in step
two, with the exceptions noted above. After the brainstorming is
finished, fighting alternatives are evaluated against all of the
stakeholders’ interests. The lawyer and client can then review the impact
of various combinations of fighting alternatives on stakeholders’
interests and even generate talking points or scenarios on how packages
of fighting alternatives actually affect a particular stakeholder’s interests.
The analysis then provides the necessary counterbalance to consider
various proposal options and make decisions about which path serves the
client’s interests best.103

98. As with brainstorming actions in step two, there is a structured approach by using the
interest chart, starting with the first issue and thinking of every possible fighting alternative that
might impact stakeholder interests.
99. See MONAHAN, supra note 60, at 170.
100. Therefore, as part of a comprehensive risk assessment, the client must not only consider
its own alternatives, or its BATNA, but it must also consider what the other stakeholders might do if
there is no agreement. See, e.g., MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 32-33 (discussing from a
slightly different perspective the importance of knowing your BATNA as well as anticipating the
BATNAs of your negotiating counterparts).
101. See MONAHAN, supra note 60, at 170-72 (expounding on the general principles of fighting
alternatives).
102. For example, while the likelihood for the husband of threatening to bring a certain motion
may be one hundred percent, the likelihood of actually filing that motion may only be forty percent,
and prevailing overall may be only twenty percent.
103. See Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of
Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 12 (2003) (“By definition,
whenever there is a negotiated agreement in a two-party negotiation both parties must believe that a
negotiated outcome leaves them at least as well off as they would have been if there were no
agreement.”); Pistone, supra note 95, at 459 (“In choosing which strategy to employ the attorney
needs to consider what her client’s hopes and fears are. Specifically, how good or bad the client’s
BATNA is should play a large part in determining the negotiation [strategy] . . . .”).
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CONCLUSION

In making interest-based negotiation the exclusive tool for lawyers
in helping clients with their disputes, collaborative law asks again
whether lawyers (and their clients) are as effective and willing as they
could be in implementing that approach. The barriers to effective use by
both lawyers and clients are significant, but with the right focus and
systematic structure, interest-based negotiation can fulfill its promise as
the best practice104 for resolving legal disputes and for improving the
attorney-client working relationship.

104. See Schneider, supra note 30, at 196.

